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One of the most intriguing questions of economics concerns the conditions under which deeper integration is possible and the
circumstances that make integration fail. And fail it does remarkably often: more than 100 new countries emerged in the course of
the 20th century alone. Clearly, political and cultural motives such as a sense of separate identity and nationalism are of paramount
importance as factors behind secessionist tendencies. Nevertheless, economic considerations also play an important role. Among
them, the fact that unions tend to use ﬁscal policy to redistribute income across regions is often controversial. Such ﬁscal unions
can feature inter-regional transfers that have been agreed upon, negotiated, and formalized explicitly, or that occur because of central-
ized automatic stabilizers such as progressive income tax, unemployment beneﬁts, and the like. Disagreements about inter-regional
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148 J. Fidrmuc / European Journal of Political Economy 40 (2015) 147–157important role in the break-up of Czechoslovakia and have signiﬁcantly contributed to inter-regional tensions in Belgium, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.
Nevertheless, ﬁscal transfers also have an important beneﬁt in that they facilitate risk sharing. This aspect of integration has
been highlighted by, among others, Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gal andMonacelli (2008), and Farhi andWerning (2013). These
studies emphasize the beneﬁts – higher welfare due to consumption smoothing – that accrue to the participating countries
when they enter into a mutual-insurance arrangement. As Farhi and Werning (2013) point out, these beneﬁts are particularly
large when ﬁscal policy is the only tool at the government's disposal (for example, when a country gives up independent mon-
etary policy in order to participate in a currency union and thus loses the ability to use monetary policy to counter asymmetric
shocks) and when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete (because regions and individuals cannot use ﬁnancial products to insure
against shocks). Furthermore, the bigger and the more persistent are the shocks, the more attractive it is to form a ﬁscal
union (Farhi and Werning, 2013).
The aforementioned contributions, while insightful, focus on the economic andwelfare implications of ﬁscal unions. In this paper,
instead, I consider the political economy of such arrangements. In a nutshell, a mutual-insurance arrangement that is optimal ex ante
may be rejected by one of the parties ex post, once the shocks are realized. I formulate a model that is a dynamic version of the static
model of Bolton and Roland (1997). It features a union composed of two countries with a centrally provided public good. As long as
integration continues, ﬁscal policy reﬂects the union median voter's preferences which, in turn, depend on the aggregate effect of re-
gional shocks.1 The two regions thus constitute an implicit ﬁscal union: ﬁscal redistribution occurs through centralized ﬁscal policy
rather than by means of explicit inter-regional transfers. The regions, however, have the option to secede and implement their
own preferred ﬁscal policy if the utility gain from doing so outweighs the cost of secession. Because of the shocks, a union that was
previously stable can break-up following a particular regional shock, whether positive or negative. The opposite is also true; a region
that preferred independence initially can come to prefer integration in the wake of a particular shock.
The analysis suggests that two aspects of shocks are important: the symmetry (or correlation) of shocks across regions and their
persistence over time.With respect to the former, holding everything else constant, positively correlated (symmetric) shocks are good
for the stability of integration. This is because the shocks change both regions' preferred ﬁscal policies in a similarmanner: either both
prefermore extensive redistribution or both prefer to scale it down. In this,my results echo themainﬁnding of the optimum currency
area theory (Mundell, 1961;McKinnon, 1963), which considers currency unionswith commonmonetary rather than ﬁscal policy. The
situation becomes more complicated when shocks are negatively correlated. In this case, ﬁscal-policy preferences diverge but the re-
gions beneﬁt from mutual insurance: under centralized ﬁscal policy, the region with a positive shock makes a net transfer to the re-
gion hit by a negative shock. This is where persistence of shocks proves crucial. With temporary shocks, the disutility from having
suboptimal ﬁscal policy is short-lived andmay be compensated by the beneﬁts from risk sharing. When shocks are permanent, how-
ever, ﬁscal transfers become largely deterministic and unidirectional. The cost of having to put up with suboptimal ﬁscal policy, like-
wise, becomes long lasting. As a result, either region, or both, can prefer to secede in such a case so as to implement the region's
preferred ﬁscal redistribution.
To illustrate theworkings of themodel, consider the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1993.2 Themodel predicts that a previous-
ly stable union can unravel due to asymmetric and persistent shocks. In Czechoslovakia's case, the shockwas precipitated by the eco-
nomic reforms initiated in 1990–91. While the reform took place in both parts of Czechoslovakia, it affected Slovakia much more
severely than the Czech Republic: per-capita GDP fell by 12 percent in the Czech Republic during 1991–92 and by 20 percent in
Slovakia; Czech unemployment, similarly, remained low, 2.6 percent in 1992, while the Slovak ﬁgure was 11.8 percent (see
Fidrmuc et al., 1999, and Fidrmuc, 2000). This asymmetric effect of the reform shock was largely due to the greater dependence of
Slovakia on tradewith the former Eastern Block:much of the Slovak industrywas built during the communist period so that the econ-
omywas highly dependent on tradewith other communist countries (see Fidrmuc et al., 1999, and the references therein). This trade
essentially collapsed after the communist regime and central planning were abandoned. The reform thus constituted a negative and
persistent shock, which affected Slovakia more severely and more persistently than the Czech Republic.3 The greater cost of reform
translated into greater support for redistribution in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, which was reﬂected in the outcomes of
the 1992 election (Fidrmuc, 2000).
The nature of the reform-induced shocks should have given an incentive to the Czech Republic to push for a break-up: it ex-
perienced a less-severe shock and it was also richer and therefore cross-subsidized Slovakia ﬁscally.4 However, the Czech
Republic was twice the size of Slovakia (10 million vs 5 million) so that it had much more sway over ﬁscal policy than
Slovakia. It was, therefore, the poorer country that pushed for the break-up. As I argue below, the poor region may prefer seces-
sion if income inequality in the union is high enough and/or the negative shock is sufﬁciently severe: then, the poor region can
choose to secede in order to impose higher taxes and redistribute more, even if this comes at a cost of losing the ﬁscal transfer
from the rich region.1 The shocks need not be only output shocks (i.e. deviations from the trend growth rate): the analysis is general enough to allow also demographic shocks such as
migration ﬂows, or natural disasters.
2 For an extensive discussion of the economic background of the break-up of Czechoslovakia, see Fidrmuc et al. (1999).
3 Slovak unemployment continued to rise steadily also after the break-up until it peaked at 19.2 percent in 1999. Czech unemployment remained in single digits,
peaking at 8.8 percent in 2000.
4 See Fidrmuc et al. (1999, Section 3.2) for some evidence of ﬁscal transfers within Czechoslovakia.
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forms, and to the size and persistence of the adverse shock experienced by Slovakia. Had the shocks beenmore symmetric, or had the
asymmetric repercussions in Slovakia been of less persistent nature, Czechoslovakia might have well survived. 5
There is already a rich body of literature analyzing the incentives that countries face to secede: Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003a/
b), Alesina et al. (2000), Alesina and Perotti (1998), Bolton and Roland (1997), Goyal and Staal (2004), Le Breton andWeber (2003),
Hindriks and Lockwood (2009), and Lülfesmann et al. (2015). However, much of this literature (with the exception of Alesina and
Perotti, 1998, whose paper I discuss below) is static in nature: they consider the trade-off between heterogeneity of preferences
and efﬁciency gains from integration (or efﬁciency loss from disintegration), without giving much thought to the factors that
might drive preferences further apart or closer together as time passes. My analysis, in contrast, is concerned with offering insights
on the reasons why unions that were originally stable subsequently break up.
Alesina and Perotti (1998) also consider ﬁscal integration between regions that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Their analytical
framework, however, differs frommine in several important aspects. First, they consider shocks that are permanent and perfectly neg-
atively correlated across regions. As such, their analysis does not allow inferences on the importance of either correlation or persis-
tence of shocks. Second, they model shocks in a way that ensures that they do not affect income distribution and, correspondingly,
they do not change the preferences over ﬁscal policy in the participating regions. Therefore, shocks in their model make the tax
base stochastic but not the tax rate. Third, they assume that income distribution in each region is discontinuous: individuals belong
to three discrete income classes. This means that themedian voter in the union is always the same, regardless of the shocks. This, to-
gether with their assumption on the nature of shocks, implies that the tax rate under ﬁscal centralization becomes stochastic: specif-
ically, it depends only on the shock to the region of the median voter. The tax base, in contrast, is constant under ﬁscal centralization
because the region-speciﬁc shocks cancel each other out. Hence, their main conclusion is essentially the same as that of the static po-
litical economy literature discussed above: while ﬁscal integration offers some beneﬁts in terms of risk sharing (the tax base that it
constant over time), this comes at the cost of increased heterogeneity in policy preferences (tax rate that changes depending on
the shocks' realization).
The paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces the model. Section 3 outlines the regions' incentives for secession
and shows how stability of integration is determined by the nature of shocks. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
I consider a union composed of two regions denoted by k= a, b. For simplicity, the regions are assumed to be of equal size (I dis-
cuss later the implications of assuming asymmetrically sized ormultiple regions). The aggregate output of region k at time t consists of
a deterministic and a stochastic term:5 Sim
mining
through
erendum
recessio
both ofYk;t ¼ Yk þ Ek;t ð1Þwhere Ykis the deterministic term and represents the region's potential output which I assume to be constant over time (adding a
constant-trendgrowth ratewould represent a trivialmodiﬁcationwhich I donot pursue for the sake of simplicity). Ek,t is the stochastic
component of region k's output in period t; this term can be either positive or negative. The stochastic component is intended to cap-
ture any factors that are idiosyncratic to the region and cause its output to ﬂuctuate over time. As such, it can include business cycle
ﬂuctuations due to demand or supply shocks, weather- and climate-related shocks, natural disasters. discoveries of natural resources,
and the like. I assume that the region-speciﬁc shocks are independent of each other but, as I discuss in more detail below, each shock
can have spillover effect on the other region. Finally, the output of the union is given as the sum of the regional outputs.
The region's output can be expressed in per-capita terms:yk;t ¼ yk þ εk;t ð2Þwhereyk is the average deterministic income and εk is the per-capita income shock. I assume that the region-speciﬁc shock follows an
AR(1) processεk;t ¼ ρkεk;t−1 þ ηk;t ð3Þwhere ηk,t is white noise with a zero mean and variance σk2. I assume that the persistence parameter, ρk, is between zero and one,
0 ≤ ρk ≤ 1: if shocks have persistent effect, they do not cause oscillation (assuming negative persistence parameter would be relativelyilar arguments could be put forward to explain the inter-regional tensions in Belgium and the UK. In Belgium, the economy ofWallonia, heavily dependent on
andmetallurgy, has been in decline from the 1950s onwards. Flanders, in themeantime, beneﬁted from the expansion of services, and from the growth of trade
the port of Antwerp (Buyst, 2009). In the UK, the attraction of Scottish independence heavily reﬂects the expected revenue from North Sea oil. The recent ref-
on Scottish independence was called when the oil price was rising (positive shock for Scotland) and the rest of the UK economy was in the grip of a major
n (negative shock). By the time the referendum took place, in September 2014, the oil price was falling again and the UK economy returned to positive growth,
which made the prospect of Scotland seceding less attractive than continued integration.
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such form). The union's average output is then6 Tak
income
7 Hen
8 See
9 Alth
erage shyt ¼
ya þ yb
2
þ εa;t þ εb;t
2
¼ yþ εt ð4Þwhere, for notational purposes, parameters lacking a subscript are those pertaining to the union as a whole.
Each individual similarly has a deterministic income every period: for individual i in region k, this is denoted as υik. Individual in-
comes are assumed to take values between υ and V, where υ is a positive number that is high enough to ensure that no low-income
individual experiences a negative income after an adverse shock.6 I make certain speciﬁc assumptions about the distribution of indi-
vidual incomes:
1. Income distribution is skewed so that themedian income, υmk, is always smaller than or equal to the average income, υmk ≤ yk and
υm ≤ y, where subscriptsmk andm denote the median individuals in region k and in the union, respectively.
2. The distribution function, while skewed, is continuous.7
3. All individuals living in region k encounter the same shock, εk,tso that individual i's actual income is υik;t ¼ υik þ εk;t. While this as-
sumption may be too restrictive, the results of mymodel would hold also when assuming that the individual shocks encountered
by all individuals living in the same region are positively correlated or even less restrictively, that only the average andmedian in-
comes are subject to similar shocks.
4. The union median income, υm,t, is subject to the average shock, εt.
The fourth assumption may come across as counter-intuitive: the median individual must be either from region a or b and
therefore is exposed to the shock affecting that region only. However, after the shocks are realized, the income distributions
in the two regions shift relative to each other. Therefore, while the regional median voters are always the same individuals,
the union's median individual is different every period (unless the two regional shocks exactly cancel out). The identity of
the union median voter changes after every realization of the two regional shocks in such a way that the income of the newme-
dian voter differs from the income of the previous period's median voter by an amount that equals to the average shock. There-
fore, assumption (4) follows from the assumption that the regional income distributions are continuous, and it constitutes a
crucial difference between my model and that of Alesina and Perotti (1998), who assume that the union median voter always
belongs to the same country (and her identity does not depend on the shocks).8 In contrast, inmymodel, the union's ﬁscal policy
depends on the average economic conditions in the union: it is the level of median income and not the nationality of themedian-
income individual that matters for ﬁscal redistribution.9
The following numerical example helps illustrate the rationale behind assumption (4): Region a has 150 citizens with in-
come distribution such that the poorest individual has an income of 100, the next individual has 100.5, then 101, and so on in
increments of 0.5 until the 49th individual whose income is 124. The 50th individual's income is 125, followed by 126, and so
on in increments of 1 until the 150th individual whose income is 225. The income distribution in region b is identical with
one exception: it has 149 citizens and the highest income is 224 (this ensures that the population of the union of these two re-
gions is an odd number and the unionmedian income can be clearly ascribed to a speciﬁc individual or individuals). The average
income, at 154.2, exceeds themedian income of 150. Each region has exactly one individual with an income of 150 and therefore
the pivotal voter can originate from either a or b. Now consider the case where region b individuals are hit by a per-capita shock
of 20 while incomes in region a remain unaffected. Correspondingly, the median income in a remains the same as before while
the median income in b falls by 20. The union median income falls by 10–140 (with the average income in the union now being
144.2). Note that not only the median income but also the identity of the median voter changes. Before the shock, there were
two individuals with an income of 150, one in each region. The one in a still has the same income, whereas her counterpart in
b now has an income of 130, and neither of them is the union's median individual after the shock. As before, the new median
voter can be either from a or b as both will have exactly one individual with an income of 140. Whether the new median
voter is from a (and therefore experiences no shock) or from b (and has seen her income falling by 20) does not matter.
What matters (as is explained in the discussion of how the tax rate is determined in the following two paragraphs) is the
level of median income in the union and how it compares to the mean income.
Individuals derive utility from consumption of private and public goods with an increasing and concave utility function: u′(.) N 0
and u″(.) b 0. I assume that there is no lending or borrowing either by individuals or by the government. This assumption means that
neither individuals nor the government can smooth theproﬁle of consumption over timeby accumulating or runningdown savings so
that any consumption smoothing that occurs is the result of inter-regional risk sharing. The government has two instruments of ﬁscal
policy at its disposal: a linear tax and a public good. Taxation is distortionary: levying a tax of t is associatedwith a cost of t
2
t
2. Since thereing υ=0would not affect themodel's predictions, as long as themedian-income individual never experiences a negative after-shock income. Negativemedian
would imply a tax rate exceeding 100 percent (see Eq. (7) below).
ce, I speciﬁcally rule out discontinuos distributions such as the one assumed by Alesina and Perotti (1995).
Eq. (6) in their paper, noting that the regional shocks are assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated so that they cancel out in the denominator.
ough the rationale behind the fourth assumption is fairly straightforward, as the following paragraph shows, the fact that themedian voter responds to the av-
ock could also reﬂect bargaining between the two regions in the spirit of Besley and Coate (2003) and Aidt and Dutta (forthcoming).
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amount of tax revenue collected less the cost of taxation:10 The
assumpgt ¼ tt−
t2t
2
 !
yt : ð5ÞEach individual receives the same amount of the public good. Private and public goods are assumed to be perfectly substitutable so
that the utility function is linear in consumption. The consumption of individual i from region k then is:cik;t ¼ 1−ttð Þυik;t þ tt−
t2t
2
 !
yt : ð6ÞThe tax rate is determined by a union-wide vote. I assume voting takes place each period after the regional shocks have become
known. Since voters' preferences are single-peaked and the individuals cannot save to smooth consumption intertemporarily, the
tax rate will be chosen so as to maximize the median voter's consumption in period t:tt yt ;υm;t
 
¼ yt−υm;t
yt
ð7ÞThe tax rate thus depends on the skewness of income distribution: the greater the difference between the average andmedian in-
comes, the higher the tax rate.
The regions' preferences over ﬁscal policy may differ from the preferences of the union median voter. In particular, each region's
optimal tax rate is the rate that maximizes consumption of that region's median-income voter:tk;t yk;t ;υmk;t
 
¼ yk;t−υmk;t
yk;t
: ð8ÞFiscal policy as chosen by the union median voter responds to region-speciﬁc shocks. In particular, the tax rate is counter-
cyclical:∂tt
∂εk;t
¼−1
2
yt−υm;t
y2t
b0so that the tax rate rises during a recession and falls during a boom. This is because the shock alters the skewness of income distribu-
tion, as captured by the ratio υm;tyt . On the other hand, the public good is pro-cyclical:∂gt
∂εk;t
¼ 1
4
t2t N0:Importantly, the union tax rate and public good provision change, as argued above, not because the preferences of the union's me-
dian voter change but because a different individual with a different income becomes pivotal in the union after the regional shocks
have been realized.
The fact that ﬁscal policy responds to regional shocks stems from the preceding assumptions that the shocks are additive and the
same shocks affect both themedian and the average incomes. This implies that the poor are more vulnerable to shocks than the rich:
since the shock is the same for everyone, it constitutes a greater share of the deterministic income of poor individuals. This can be ra-
tionalized by the fact that the ability to diversify risks tends to increasewith income: the poor typically derivemost or all of their earn-
ings from labor while investment income can be an important component of earnings for the rich. The alternative assumption of
multiplicative shocks, in contrast, would result in the shocks having no effect on ﬁscal policy: additive shocks alter the skewness of
income distribution, υm;tyt ¼
υm;tþεt
yþεt , whereas multiplicative shocks cancel out,
υm;t
yt
¼ υm;tð1þεt Þyð1þεt Þ .
10
The region's preferred tax rate thus depends on that region's income distribution and the realization of the region-speciﬁc shock.
Unless the incomedistributions and shocks are identical in both regions, their preferred tax rateswill be different fromeach other and
bothwill, in turn, differ from theunion tax rate. Therefore,without efﬁciencygains, economies of scale, or other beneﬁts of integration,
the two regions would always prefer independence and ﬁscal autonomy to ﬁscal integration.latter is the reasonwhy in Alesina and Perotti’s (1998)model ﬁscal policy is independent of shocks in case of independence.With integration, in contrast, their
tion that the median voter stems always from the same region means that ﬁscal policy responds only to that region’s shock.
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3.1. Integration vs secession
The tax rate in Eq. (7) maximizes the consumption of the union's median voter during each period. The tax rates preferred by
the two regional median voters are generally different from the union tax rate as well as from each other: they would be the same
only if the two regions had the same income distributions and faced exactly the same shocks. Integration thus carries the cost of
compromising over ﬁscal policy. On the other hand, integration brings about two important beneﬁts. First, it implies efﬁciency
gains and economies of scale because of free trade, unrestricted ﬂow of factors of production, and access to a larger market. Second,
and this is particularly important in the context of my analysis, integration is associated with risk sharing. Note that risk sharing and
inter-regional redistribution are not explicitly determined in the present model: the regions do not vote on or bargain about inter-
regional transfers. Instead, risk sharing occurs automatically because tax collection and ﬁscal transfers are determined at the union-
wide level: they reﬂect the union-wide income distribution and the average of the two regional shocks. Moreover, risk sharing is
only a side effect of ﬁscal policy: its main objective is redistribution from rich to poor. The rich region may be making a net transfer
to the poor one even if the former is hit by a negative shock, as long as it remains richer than the poor region – but the size of the
net transfer is sensitive to the shock.
Each period, the regions decide whether to remain in the union or secede. This decision takes place before the region-speciﬁc
shocks are realized. Therefore, the decision is based on the expectations of current period's shocks, which in turn depend on the
past shocks and their persistence. I assume that the persistence of past shocks is common knowledge. The decision on ﬁscal policy,
on the other hand, ismade after the shocks have been revealed and therefore taxes and transfers reﬂect the actual realization of shocks
in the current period. The union breaks up whenever at least one region votes for secession.
Secession comes at a cost λk,t ≤ 0, which I assume to be independent of the regional shocks. This cost reﬂects the loss of efﬁciency
due to disintegration aswell as the cost of creating a new regional government, military, etc. The cost is likely to be substantial imme-
diately after breaking up the union and may fall thereafter. Specifying a particular time proﬁle for this cost is not material for the
model's results, however, given that the decision on secession reﬂects the shocks and the cost of secession is independent of those.
Finally, the cost need not be symmetric: one of the regions can ﬁnd secession less costly, for example, because of considerations
such as national pride, patriotism, or historical legacies.
Givenmajority voting, the decision to secede therefore depends on whether the region's median voter is better off under integra-
tion or under secession, taking into account the difference between the region's preferred ﬁscal policy and the union's ﬁscal policy
(this difference in turn depends on the realizations of region-speciﬁc shocks) and the efﬁciency loss due to secession.We can formal-
ize this as follows (to simplify the notation, I use subscript kwhen referring to the region's own variables while−k denotes variables
pertaining to the other region):
Deﬁnition 1. Region k has an incentive to secede if the median voter expects greater consumption under secession than under integration,
i.e. secession brings about a positive expected gain from secession11 Bolt
1998; HΔk;t ≡Et cmk;t εk;t ;λk;t
 
−cumk;t εk;t ; ε−k;t
 h i
N0 ð9ÞHere, cmk,tu (εk,t, ε−k,t) is the consumption of region k's median voter in case of continued integration. Given that the shocks are
autocorrelated, (9) can be rewritten as follows:Δk;t ≡ cmk;t ρkεk;t−1;λk;t
 
−cumk;t ρkεk;t−1;ρ−kε−k;t−1
 
N0 ð10ÞThe outcome of the vote on secession therefore depends on the realization of previous period's shocks and their persistence.
As a digression, Eq. (9) is a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for secession.Whether secession occurs depends on the net pres-
ent value of the gain from secession, NPVSk,t ≡∑s = 0∞ δsEtΔk,t + s (assuming secession is irreversible). The sufﬁcient condition for se-
cession then is NPVSa,t + NPVSb,t N 0, reﬂecting the fact that as long as at least one region prefers integration, it can offer concession
to the other region to prevent it from seceding.11 This, however, would introduce the possibility of strategic behavior, especially if
λk,t is not observable: either region could threaten to leave the union in order to elicit concessions from the other region.While inter-
esting, such considerations are largely orthogonal to the question of the effect of shocks on integration. Therefore, I do not include
them in this paper but they are discussed (brieﬂy) in the ﬁnal section.
To evaluate the expected gain from secession, note that under integration, the consumption of individual i in region k is:cuik;t εk;t ; ε−k;t
 
¼ υik;t þ
1
2
yt−υm;t
yt
yt−υik;t
 
þ υm;t−υik;t
 h i
ð11Þon and Roland (1997) discuss bargaining over tax rate as union-preserving measure. Another possibility is inter-regional transfers (see Dixit and Londregan,
arstad, 2008; Claeys and Martire, 2014).
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 
¼ υmk;t þ
1
2
yt−υm;t
yt
yt−υmk;t
 
þ υm;t−υmk;t
 h i
: ð12ÞFinally, the consumption of region k'smedian voter under secession is the following (note that it incorporates the cost of secession,
λk,t):cmk;t εk;t ;λa;t
 
¼ υmk;t þ
1
2
yk;t−υmk;t
 2
yk;t
þ λk;t ð13ÞAfter substituting from Eqs. (13) and (12), the expected gain from secession, Δk,t can be rewritten in the followingmanner:12Δk;t ¼ Et
1
2
υm;t−υmk;t
 2
yt
þ 1
2
yk;t−yt
 
1−
υ2mk;t
ykyt
 !264
3
75þ λk;t ð14ÞThe ﬁrst term in Eq. (14) reﬂects the differences in incomedistributions between the union as awhole and region k. The greater the
difference, the greater the incentive for the region to leave. Note that the incentive to secede increases with the absolute difference:
even the poor region can gain from seceding because it can implement its preferred ﬁscal policy in that case. The second termcaptures
the difference in tax base: the higher the region k's mean income compared to the union's mean income, the greater the incentive to
secede. Finally, the last term captures the cost of secession, which is always negative by assumption.
For the relatively rich region, therefore, the ﬁrst two terms are both positive. If secession were costless, the rich region would
always want to secede. For the poor region, the ﬁrst term is positive but the second term is negative so that this region may prefer
continued integration even if secession were possible at no cost. It is, however, possible that the poor region would prefer to secede,
for example, if its mean income is only slightly lower than the union mean income (so that the positive tax effect is modest) but its
income distribution is much more skewed than in the other region. In such a case, the beneﬁt from being able to implement the
region's preferred ﬁscal policy might outweigh the cost of losing the net transfer from the richer region. The break-up of Czechoslo-
vakia, instigated by Slovakia, the poorer country in the federation, may be an example of this (as discussed in the Introduction).
3.2. Effects of shocks
Next, I turn to the role played by the region-speciﬁc shocks. Voters in one or both regions may be induced to vote for secession
either in response to the home region's shock or because of the other region's shock: either shock can raise or reduce the incentive
for secession captured by the expected gain from secession, Δk,t.
The following two assumptions help make the analysis tractable:
A1 Region a is always richer than region b; this holds both for the median incomes as well as (weakly) for the average incomes:
υma,t N υm,t N υmb,t and ya,t ≥ yt ≥ yb,t. This is not to say that shocks cannot be large enough to reverse the relative ordering of
the two regions. Rather, it merely means that which ever region happens to be richer is labeled as region a. The implication
is that region a's median voter would prefer strictly lower extent of redistribution than the union median voter if she were
pivotal, whereas the opposite is true for region b's median voter: υma;ty N
υm;t
y N
υmb;t
y .
A2 The median income in either region does not exceed the union's average income: υmk,t b yt (i.e. neither median voter would
prefer tt⁎=0 if pivotal in the union). This assumptionmay be reasonable for many but not all ﬁscal unions: themedian income
in Luxembourg is probably greater than the average income in the EU or the Eurozone. I discuss below the implication of
relaxing it.
Because the vote on secession takes place before the shocks are realized, the decision is based on the expectations of the current
period's shocks which in turn depend on the realizations of previous period's shocks and their persistence, Etεk,t = ρkεk,t − 1 and
Etε−k,t = ρ−kε−k,t − 1. I consider the impact of the other region's shock ﬁrst:
Proposition 1. (a) Assuming that the persistence parameter is positive, ρ−k N 0, positive shock in the other region at time t− 1 reduces
the home region's incentive to secede at time t, a negative shock increases the incentive to secede.∂Δk;t
∂ε−k;t−1
b 0(b) The effect is greater (in absolute value) for region a than for region b (ceteris paribus).e that the variables pertaining to the union, υm,t and yt, depend on both shocks, (εk,t, ε−k,t), whereas υmk,t and yk,t only depend on εk,t.
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∂ε−k;t−1
¼ 1
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υm;t−υmk;t
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y2t
−
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y2t
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75ρ−k ð15ÞThe RHS of Eq. (15) can be reduced to14
1
y2t
ðyt−υm;t þ 2υmk;tÞðυm;t−ytÞρ−k. The second term in parentheses is negative for both regions
by assumption A2. Given that I assume that the intertemporal correlation term is positive, the expression is negative for both regions.
(b) Assumption A1 implies υma,t N υmb,t, so that the absolute value of this expression is higher for region a than for region b. ■
The upshot of Proposition 1 is that for a given realization of the region's own shock, εk,t− 1, either region is more likely to secede if
the other region encountered a negative shock in the preceding period, ε−k,t− 1 b 0. The intuition underlying this result is simple. For a
given own shock, εk,t − 1, a positive shock in the other region reduces the expected union tax rate (tax rate effect) and raises the ex-
pected level of government spending (transfer effect). The transfer effect increases consumption in both regions. The tax effect is dif-
ferent, though. The median voter in region a prefers a lower tax rate than the union tax rate by assumption A1. A positive shock in
region b decreases the expected union tax rate, so that the expected disparity between region a's preferred tax rate and the union
tax rate shrinks. The transfer effect also implies that the incentive for region a to secede falls after a positive shock in region b. On
the other hand, region b's preferred tax rate is higher than the tax rate chosen by the union median voter. Thus, as the expected
union tax rate falls, the expected disparity between the two tax rates widens even further. Hence, the tax effect and the transfer effect
go in opposite directions for region b. The response of region bwill therefore be smaller than the response of region a, even though the
overall effect is unambiguously positive for both regions.
Without the assumption A2, the sign of Eq. (15) may be positive so that the home region would be more likely to secede
after a positive shock in the other region. It also implies that the median voter of the richer region would prefer a zero tax
rate if pivotal in the union. Both of these effects are rather counter-intuitive and difﬁcult to rationalize, and therefore, I disregard
this possibility.
Analyzing how the decision on secession is affected by the region's own shock is less straightforward. Differentiating Δk,t with
respect to εk,t − 1 while holding ε−k,t − 1 constant yields:∂Δk;t
∂εk;t−1
¼ −1
2
υm;t−υmk;t
yt
−
1
4
υm;t−υmk;t
 2
y2t
þ υmk;t
yk;t
−
υmk;t
yt
−
1
2
υ2mk;t
y2k;t
þ 1
4
þ 1
4
υ2mk;t
y2t
2
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75ρk ð16ÞThe sign of this expression is analytically ambiguous. Therefore, I consider ﬁrst a simpliﬁed case:
Proposition 2. If mean incomes before shocks are the same in both regions, i.e. ya,t= yb,t= yt, and assuming that the persistence parameter
is positive, ρk N 0, then:
(a) A positive shock in region a will increase this region's incentive to secede. A negative shock in region a will reduce this region's incen-
tive to split off:∂Δa;t
∂εa;t−1
N0(b) The response of region b depends on the difference between themedian income in b and the union's median: ∂Δb;t∂εb;t−1 is positive for small
(υmb,t− υm,t) and negative otherwise.
Proof. For ya,t = yb,t = yt, Eq. (16) can be rewritten as follows:∂Δk;t
∂εk;t−1
¼ −1
2
υm;t−υmk;t
yt
−
1
4
υm;t−υmk;t
 2
y2t
þ 1
4
y2t−υ
2
mk;t
y2t
2
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75ρk
¼ 1
4
y2t−υ
2
m;t
 
þ 1
2
υmk;t−υm;t
 
yt−υmk;t
   1
y2t
ρkThe ﬁrst term of the expression in the second line above is always positive. The second term is positive for region a and negative for
region b; this follows from assumptions A1 and A2. Hence, ∂Δa;t∂εa;t−1 is positive, whereas
∂Δb;t
∂εb;t−1
can be either positive or negative. When
(υmb,t− υm,t) is small in absolute value, the ﬁrst term outweighs the second term, and the opposite is true for large (υmb,t− υm,t). ■
The result described in Proposition 2 again reﬂects the tax effect and the transfer effect. A positive shock in either region reduces
the expected union tax rate and raises the expected transfer. In case of region A, themedian voter's preferred tax rate is lower than the
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preferred tax rate falls by more, thus further increasing the difference between the two tax rates.13 The transfer, on the other hand,
rises in thewake of a positive shock. However, region a's tax base ya,t rises bymore that the union's tax base yt. This implies that region
awould enjoy a greater increase in the level of the transfer in case of secession. Both these effects make secessionmore attractive for
region a.14
In region b, the median voter's preferred tax rate is above the union's tax rate. A positive shock results in the reduction of both the
expected union's tax rate aswell as the region b's expected tax rate. The expectation of the region's preferred tax rate falls bymore and
the difference in this case thus shrinks. The transfer effect on region b is similar the effect on region a described above. Hence, for re-
gion b, the tax and transfer effects go in opposite directions. Depending on how different the two regional income distributions are
from each other, the overall effect therefore can be positive or negative.
3.3. Persistence and correlation of shocks
The discussion so far has been a rather straightforward extension of Bolton and Roland's analysis, discussing how changes in
the regional distribution of incomes (caused by region-speciﬁc shocks) alter the incentives for secession and thus induce the
union to break up. Next, I consider how the stability of integration – and in turn the likelihood of disintegration – depends on
the nature of shocks. So far, I considered only the response of each region to their own shock and to the shock affecting their
union partner. Now I look at the speciﬁc properties of the shocks: their persistence over time and their correlation across
regions.
Proposition 3. Persistence: Assume the union is a-priori stable, i.e. neither regionwould vote for secession in the absence of shocks:13 Rec
εa,t = εb
14 If th
merical
is positiΔk;t ρkεk;t−1;ρ−kε−k;t−1
 εk;t−1¼ ε−k;t−1¼0≤0Then, assuming the other region's shock is white noise, ρ−k,t − 1 = 0, for a positive value of own shock, εk,t − 1 N 0, there is a value
of the persistence parameter ρk such that Δk,t(ρkεk,t − 1, 0) ≤ 0 for every ρk≤ ρk . Similarly, assuming the home region's shock is
white noise, ρk,t − 1 = 0, for a negative shock in the other region, ε−k,t − 1 b 0, there is a value of the persistence parameter ρ−k such
that Δk,t(0, ρ−kε−k,t − 1) ≤ 0 for every ρ−k≤ ρ−k. If ρk and ρ−k are less then one, then secession takes place if ρkNρk and ρ−kNρ−k,
respectively.
Proof. The expected gain from secession rises for εk,t− 1 N 0 and/or ε−k,t− 1 b 0 (and falls for εk,t− 1 b 0 and/or ε−k,t− 1 N 0). As follows
from Eqs. (15) and (16), ∂Δk;t∂εk;t−1 and
∂Δk;t
∂ε−k;t−1
equal zero for ρk=0and ρ−k=0, respectively. Hence, if both shocks arewhite noise, they do
not affect the expected gain from secession and hence they do not undermine the stability of integration. If either shock is persistent,
ρk N 0 or ρ−k N 0, then the following holdsΔk;t ρkεk;t−1;0
 ρk;t−1N0;εk;t−1N0NΔk;t jρk;t−1¼ ρ−k;t−1¼ 0
Δk;t 0;ρ−kε−k;t−1
 ρ−k;t−1b 0;ε−k;t−1b 0NΔk;t jρk;t−1¼ ρ−k;t−1¼ 0By continuity, Δk,t(ρkεk,t − 1, 0) ≤ 0 (Δk,t(0, ρ−kε−k,t − 1) ≤ 0) holds for at least part of the interval 0 b ρk ≤ 1 (0 b ρ−k ≤ 1). ■
The upshot of Proposition 3 is that if shocks are sufﬁciently short-lived, they will not give a sufﬁcient incentive for either region to
secede: the gain from seceding would be so small so as to be outweighed by the efﬁciency loss due to disintegration. On the other
hand, when shocks are sufﬁciently persistent, they can bring the union down.
So far, I have been assuming that the regional shocks are fully independent of one another, i.e. each shock only affects incomes in
one region. In open economies, this is unlikely to be the case: shocks have spillover effects because of trade, migration and investment
ﬂows, due to remittances from migrants or because of dividend payments on past investments. Therefore, I now consider the case
when shocks have spillover effects.
Proposition 4. Correlation: Positive correlation (spillover) of shocks reduces the probability of secession, whereas negative correlation in-
creases that probability, taking the persistence of shocks as given.all that the region's preferred tax rate fully responds to the home-region shock εk,t, whereas the union's tax rate responds to the average shock, εt≡
εa;tþεb;t
2 . Unless
,t, the region's tax rate fall by more than the union's tax rate in response to a positive home shock.
e average incomes in the two regions are different, ya,t ≠ yb,t, the effect of the region's own shock on its incentive to secede is ambiguous for both regions. Nu-
simulationswith ya,t N yb,t (using y=10,υm=7.5, and shocks between−3 and 3) yield result identical to Proposition 2, i.e.
∂Δa;t
∂εa;t−1
is alwayspositivewhereas ∂Δb;t∂εb;t−1
ve for small (υm,t− υmb,t) and negative otherwise.
156 J. Fidrmuc / European Journal of Political Economy 40 (2015) 147–157Proof.Assume shocks' effects are correlated in that there is a spillover between the regions so that individual incomes in region k also
depend on the shock experienced by the other region, ∂υikt;∂ε−kt; ¼ γ. Then, for a given home-region's shock, the shock in the other region
affects the median voter's expected gain from secession in the following manner:∂Δk;t
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75γρkThe ﬁrst term corresponds to the expression for ∂Δk;t∂ε−k;t−1 when shocks are independent, as in Eq. (15), whereas the second term cap-
tures the spillover effect of the other region's shock (cf. Eq. (16)). As shown by Proposition 1, the term in the ﬁrst brackets is negative,
while according to Proposition 2 the term in the second brackets is positive (assuming υmb,t− υm,t is sufﬁciently small). Hence, if the
spillover effects of shocks are positive, γ N 0, so that the shocks become ex post positively correlated, the second term mitigates the
effect of the ﬁrst term. On the other hand, if shocks are negatively correlated, both effects go in the same direction, thus increasing
the probability of secession. ■
The last two propositions contrasts with the key insight of the OCA literature that is concerned with monetary integration. In that
literature, only the correlation (symmetry) of shocks plays a role: currency unions are predicted to be viable if the shocks are positive-
ly correlated. The present paper adds another dimension: the persistence of shocks. In particular, ﬁscal unions can be stable evenwith
negatively correlated shocks, as long as these shocks are sufﬁciently transient.
3.4. Discussion
A number of observations can be made about other factors underlying disintegration:
Risk sharing: Integration reduces the uncertainty about ﬁscal policy. Both the tax rate and the tax base are more volatile after se-
cession than under integration. Integration thus helps smooth taxes and in turn reduces the volatility of disposable income and con-
sumption. The potential beneﬁts from risk sharing are at their greatest when shocks are negatively correlated and temporary.
Uncertainty: An increase in the variance of either shock, σk2, increases the probability of disintegration, but only if the shocks are
persistent. High variance increases the likelihood that a sufﬁciently large shock will occur to prompt one of the region to split off.
This is likely to have happened in the case of Czechoslovakia (discussed earlier) and possibly also for othermulti-ethnic unions in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe: the economic reforms implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s were associated with a substantial in-
crease in the volatility of asymmetric shocks as well as with changes in their inter-regional correlation and persistence.
Decentralization may destabilize integration arrangements if it decreases the spillovers of shocks between regions. For example,
promoting the use of regional or minority languages – such as French in Quebec, Catalan in Catalonia, or Dutch in Flanders – restricts
labor mobility across language boundaries (see Bartz and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2012). Similarly, regional policies promoting local ﬁrms
can make the regions more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks if the regions are dominated by different industries. All these measures
in turn reduce the spillovers of shocks across regions. Hence, the efforts to rescue troubled unions by increasing the autonomy of re-
gions may prove futile, and federalization, or devolution, may prove to be a step toward the slippery slope of disintegration.
Size:Relaxing the assumption of regions being equally sized, and assuming (for simplicity) that the cost of secession is independent of
size, the smaller region stands to gainmore by seceding than the larger region. Given that the union'sﬁscal policy responds to the average
shock, the larger region's shock affects the centralized ﬁscal policymore than the smaller region's shock. This implies that the smaller re-
gion is more likely to ﬁnd itself preferring secession following a particular realization of either its own shock or the other region's shock.
The relative size helps explain why disintegrations often involve the secession of a relatively small part of the original union, such as
Slovakia breaking away from the Czech Republic, the Baltic countries from the Soviet Union or Slovenia and Croatia from the former
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, allowing more than two regions in the model would be equivalent to asymmetric size. For instance, assume
that there are three equally sized regions. From the point of view of each region, the decision on secession involves considering its
own shock, and the aggregate shock in the rest of the union, with the rest of the union being twice the size of the home region.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, I seek to shed light on the reasons why unions that survived for decades or centuries suddenly unravel. While there
are oftenmanyvery diversemotives for secessionistmovements,my focus is onﬁscal policy andﬁscal redistribution. On the onehand,
inter-regional ﬁscal transfers provide insurance against asymmetric and region-speciﬁc shocks. In doing so, they help smooth con-
sumption over time. However, ﬁscal redistribution typically requires that regions delegate control over tax setting and redistribution
to a higher level of government and may end up with ﬁscal policy that deviates from their preferences. The net balance of costs and
beneﬁts of ﬁscal integration can, correspondingly, be positive or negative.
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their persistence.When the participating regions experience symmetric shocks, they donot havemuch incentive to quit (regardless of
whether the shocks are temporary or persistent). Things becomemore complicated when shocks are uncorrelated or negatively cor-
related. The beneﬁts of risk sharing can be substantial in this case. However, a sufﬁciently large and persistent shock can turn risk shar-
ing into a long-term unidirectional transfer. Europe abounds with examples of this: former Czechoslovakia (where historically ﬁscal
transfers ﬂowed from the Czech Republic to Slovakia), Belgium (Flanders cross-subsidizing Wallonia), Germany (the West making
massive ﬁscal transfers to the East), or the UK (where a major attraction of the Scottish independence has been the prospect of keep-
ing the bulk of North Sea oil revenue, which at present accrue to the UK's centralized budget). Such transfers constitute redistribution
caused by past shocks, not insurance against future ones. The reluctancewithwhich these transfers aremade, and the conditions, lim-
itations, and safeguards attached to them, underscore the importance of political economy aspects of integration.
Importantly, ﬁscal unionsmay be politically unpopular also in the countries on the receiving end of ﬁscal transfers. The protests in
Greece and Spain against austerity measures imposed from Brussels and Frankfurt demonstrate this; the break-up of Czechoslovakia,
instigated by Slovakia, the poorer partner in the federation, is another example. Quitting the ﬁscal union allows the richer country to
lower taxes and scale down redistribution. Thepoorer country can do the opposite, increase taxes and redistributemore. In both cases,
the post-independence ﬁscal policy better reﬂects the preferences of themedian voter: secession brings the government closer to the
people, in the rich and poor country alike. Depending on other factors, such as, for example, the relative sizes of the countries, it can be
the richer or the poorer region that elects to secede.
A number of potentially important considerations have been left out of the analysis. First, in the presence of continued uncertainty
about future shocks, maintaining the ﬁscal union is associated with an option value of waiting which is likely to be positive. In partic-
ular, the temptation to secede, stemming from the past shocks, can be undone by future economic ﬂuctuations. Assuming that seces-
sion is irreversible, countries therefore face a strong incentive to be cautious. This aspect of decision making under uncertainty has
been analyzed extensively by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and others.
Second, the incentive to secedewould bedifferent if the regions participating in aﬁscal union could borrow tomitigate the adverse
effects of negative shocks. In this case, the regions could engage in intertemporal rather than inter-regional insurance. The role played
by ﬁnancial markets is analyzed by Farhi andWerning (2013) who argue that the ability of regions to self-insure against asymmetric
shocks diminishes the gains from ﬁscal integration. When considering the political economy implications, anything that makes re-
gions less dependent on inter-regional transfers also diminishes their incentive to secede in the wake of particularly large shocks.
Therefore, ﬁscal unions which allow the participating regions to self-insure in the ﬁnancial markets will entail lower gains from inte-
gration but should also prove more stable over time.
Finally, unless both countries wish to secede, there is a potential for bargaining and side payments whereby one country agrees to
compensate the other sufﬁciently to stop it from seceding. As Claeys and Martire (2014) argue using examples from Spain and Italy,
side payments are often incorporated into ﬁscal federalism regimes in the realworld. Harstad (2008) shows, however, that bargaining
and side payments create an incentive for both regions to behave strategically. In particular, the secession-prone region is likely
to appoint a negotiator who values integration less than the median voter, so as to extract maximum transfer from the other side
(the outcome of the 2015 Greek election may be an illustration of this). While interesting and certainly worthwhile exploring, this
would add an additional layer to the analysis. Mymodel sheds light on factors that shape the underlying incentive to secede, leaving
the strategic aspects of bargaining about secession aside.
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